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This paper measures inﬂation persistence in Colombia for the period 1990-2010 and estimates the implied speed at which
agents learn about the central bank’s inﬂation target. We estimate Erceg and Levin’s (2003) imperfect credibility model
using Bayesian techniques and compare the posterior odds of this model against a conventional Neokeynesian model
with ad-hoc price indexation. The odds are strongly in favor of the imperfect credibility model, suggesting that lack
of credibility on the inﬂation target is an important source of inﬂation persistence. We use the model to compute the
sacriﬁce ratio associated to 100 basis points inﬂation target shocks and ﬁnd that it is (0.83%) in line with previous
estimates for Colombia. We also ﬁnd that the speed at which agents learn in the model has increased, albeit marginally,
since the central bank implemented its inﬂation targeting strategy. Although during this period macroeconomic volatility
has fallen, inﬂation persistence has remained roughly constant suggesting that so far, the impact of those credibility gains
has been modest.
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Inﬂation is a persistent process. For long, this fact has called the attention of researchers and policy
makers because it has important economic and policy implications. For instance, the central bank’s
policy response can vary depending on the degree of persistence of inﬂation shocks. If inﬂation shocks
have short-lived eﬀects, the monetary authority could react mildly to them, and inﬂation would stabilize
soon around a given target, without much impact on credibility and macroeconomic volatility. However, if
persistence is erroneously underestimated, delays in response to inﬂationary shocks could create relatively
large deviations from the central bank’s objectives, undermine the credibility of the central bank and
create additional instability.
Fuhrer (2009), in a comprehensive survey on the persistence of inﬂation, shows that even though it
constitutes a key feature of inﬂation dynamics, its deﬁnition and measurement are controversial. The
study provides a “taxonomy” of the body of research on inﬂation persistence and distinguishes “reduced-
form persistence” from “structural persistence”. The ﬁrst refers to an empirical property of inﬂation
without economic interpretation. The second refers to persistence that arises from identiﬁed economic
structures that produce it. Fuhrer surveys a variety of methodologies to measure inﬂation persistence,
from the estimation of simple autocorrelation functions to sophisticated ﬁltering techniques, and concludes
that regardless of how inﬂation persistence is deﬁned and measured, it has declined somewhat in recent
years. However, it is still a subject of debate how much it has declined.
Colombia has not been immune to this debate. The majority of local studies are econometric studies
that characterize inﬂation persistence as some measure of the degree of “mean-reversion” of the inﬂation
rate. To our knowledge, Birchenall (1999) is the ﬁrst eﬀort in Colombia to characterize inﬂation dynamics
(See Table 1). Using data for the period 1965-1996 he ﬁnds that the estimate of the autoregressive
component of the consumer price inﬂation is 0.6. Thus, the study characterized inﬂation as a persistent
stationary process. More than ten years later, Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2009) using a similar
approach (the sum of the estimated coeﬃcients of an autoregressive process) ﬁnd similar results for
Colombia (0.67), but using a larger sample of the 10 largest Latin American economies, albeit for a
shorter period (2000-2006).
More recently, Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) and Echavarría, Rodríguez, and Rojas (2010),
following the recent international literature, measure inﬂation persistence with the relative contributions
1of permanent and transitory components of inﬂation, argue that the adoption of inﬂation targeting in 1999
caused an important reduction in mean and variance, but has not signiﬁcantly modiﬁed the persistence
of inﬂation.








A recursive estimation of the autoregressive compo-
nent of CPI inﬂation is carried using data from 1965







Econometric estimation of inﬂation persistence for
the 10 largest Latin-American economies is done us-
ing univariate time-series methodologies and monthly
data from 1980 to 2006. Estimation is also carried by
sub-samples, selected by episodes of change in mone-
tary policy regime. Reported inﬂation is the sum of







Estimation of inﬂation persistence in Colombia is
carried using monthly data form CPI inﬂation be-
tween 1990 and 2010 and several econometric methods
including markov-switching models and state-space







An unobserved components model with regime-
switching is used to estimate persistence, as a second
order autoregressive process, and structural breaks
for several inﬂation indexes using quarterly sample
ranging from 1979 to 2010. Reported persistence is
the mean of the sum of autoregressive coeﬃcients for
the 1989-1999 and 1999-2010 sub-samples.
0.31 1979-2010
Indeed, Colombia used to be a country of high and volatile inﬂation. At the beginning of the nineties
the newly independent central bank (Banco de la República), began announcing end of year inﬂation
targets along with other explicit targets for other macroeconomic variables, like the nominal exchange
rate.1 These targets should guide monetary policy in order to meet the Constitutional mandate of
achieving price stability. Although no long-run inﬂation target was set, central bank oﬃcials publicly
claimed that their goal was to reduce inﬂation to a “single digit”. In 1991, in line with other central banks
1A crawling band was implemented during the ﬁrst years of the 90s.
2around the world, the Banco de la República established its ﬁrst quantitative inﬂation target of 22%.
The disinﬂation process was long and gradual. The bank missed its inﬂation target for 6 years in a
row. It was until 1999, in the midst of a mayor ﬁnancial and economic crisis, that inﬂation reached a
single digit. Later, inﬂation declined steadily (but slowly) from about 9% in 1999 to about 5% in 2005.
Nowadays, after the 2007-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, Colombian inﬂation is under control and within a
2-4% inﬂation target range. With this record at hand in such a prolonged period, one can easily guess
that credibility has not been one of the main assets of the central bank (see table 2). Thus, it is natural
to think that lack of credibility may be one factor behind the persistence of inﬂation.
Table 2: Credibility and inﬂation targeting in Colombia
Observed Expectation Target Mistake Surprise Anchoring
Year (1) (2) (3) (1)-(3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) Credibility
1997 17.68 18.45 18.0 -0.32 -0.77 0.45
1998 16.70 17.95 16.0 0.70 -1.25 1.95
1999 9.23 15.789 15.0 -5.77 -6.56 0.79
2000 8.75 9.89 10.0 -1.25 -1.14 -0.11 33.0
2001 7.65 8.85 8.0 -0.35 -1.20 0.85 46.9
2002 6.99 6.95 6.0 0.99 0.04 0.95 69.1
2003 6.49 6.58 5.5 0.99 -0.09 1.08 16.1
2004 5.50 6.13 5.5 0.00 -0.63 0.63 70.4
2005 4.86 5.78 5.0 -0.14 -0.92 0.78 79.0
2006 4.48 5.23 4.5 -0.02 -0.75 0.73 90.1
2007 5.69 4.50 4.0 1.69 1.19 0.50 25.9
2008 7.67 4.14 4.0 3.67 3.53 0.14 6.3
2009 2.00 4.65 5.0 -3.00 -2.65 -0.35 53.1
2010 3.17 5.22 3.0 0.17 -2.05 2.22 93.8
Note: Expectation refers to the expected value of the end of year inﬂation measured at the beginning of the year. Credibility refers to the number of people
that believed (at the beginning of the year) that the inﬂation target would be met that year.
Source: Banco de la República de Colombia.
The hypothesis that lack of credibility on monetary policy is a source of inﬂation persistence which,
in turn, determines the sacriﬁce ratio is not new. For instance, Ball (1994), seminal contribution, was to
showed that imperfect credibility can raise the output costs of disinﬂation. Also, Sargent (1999) argued
that the decline of US inﬂation persistence during the 90’s has been associated with an increase in the
credibility of the monetary policy, in the sense that inﬂation expectations have been anchored at a low level
and so they are unlikely to adjust to temporary increases in the inﬂation rate. Erceg and Levin (2003), in
another inﬂuential paper, studied the episode of the Volcker disinﬂation in the US using a model in which
agents learn about the ultimate intentions of the central bank. The paper calibrates a standard staggered
contracts Neokeynesian model to the US economy and ﬁnd that the cost of the Volcker disinﬂation was
31.6 percentage points for each percentage point reduction in the inﬂation rate.2 This number is similar
to other results found in the literature for the US. They show that their results are consistent with
the idea that most of the inﬂation persistence found in the US inﬂation data is attributable to lack of
credibility instead of adaptive expectations. Later, Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) examined the ﬁnancial
market implications of shifts in the inﬂation target. Using a time-series model of the term structure they
showed that failure to account for imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections of the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates.
This paper asks whether lack of credibility on the central bank’s inﬂation target could have played
an important role in explaining the persistence of inﬂation observed in the Colombian data at business
cycle frequencies. To that end we deﬁne the concept of persistence and use an econometric model to
measure it. The econometric model is able to capture the low frequency ﬂuctuations of the inﬂation rate
and conﬁrms the results found by Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) and Echavarría, Rodríguez, and
Rojas (2010) that the conventional measure of inﬂation persistence has not changed signiﬁcantly in the
last decade. Despite this, our results allows us to infer (heuristically) that the importance of persistent
shocks to inﬂation relative to transitory shocks has diminished.
Our main contribution is that we are able to identify, through an economic model, the sources behind
inﬂation persistence. We follow Erceg and Levin (2003) and use their imperfect information model to
understand them. We compare it against the conventional Neokeynesian model with inﬂation indexation.
Following Schorfheide (2000), we use Bayesian analysis to discriminate between them. We compute the
posterior odds and ﬁnd that the Colombian data supports the lack of credibility model.
We also use the model to estimate the speed at which agents learn about the ultimate intentions of
the Colombian central bank. We ﬁnd that credibility has been higher after the central implemented the
inﬂation targeting strategy by the end of 1999. In addition, we estimate how conventional estimates of
the monetary policy rule changes when the central bank lacks full credibility on its commitment to reduce
inﬂation. To our knowledge, this joint estimation of the monetary policy rule under imperfect credibility
is another new result for Colombia.3
2Typically staggered contracts models have been criticized for not being able to reproduce the observed inﬂation persistence
present in the data. Many modelers use tricks to induce persistence, like adding lags. One of the main implications of Erceg
and Levin work is that inﬂation persistence is not only an inherent characteristic of the economy, but also that it can vary
with the stability and transparency of the monetary policy regime.
3Erceg and Levin (2003), in an inﬂuential paper, studied the episode of the Volcker disinﬂation in the US using a model
in which agents have learn about the ultimate intentions of the central bank. They calibrate a standard staggered contracts
Neokeynesian model to the US economy and ﬁnd that the output cost of the Volcker disinﬂation was about 1.7 percentage
4In light of these results, we proceed to calculate the sacriﬁce ratio implied by the imperfect credibility
model. The estimated sacriﬁce ratio (0.83%) for the full sample is in line with those estimated previously
in the literature by Gómez and Julio (2000), Reyes (2003), Sarmiento and Ramírez (2005), but higher
than those obtained by Hamann, Julio, Restrepo, and Riascos (2005) for Colombia, and Hofstetter (2007)
for the average of 18 Latin American countries in a 30-years sample.








Econometric estimation of a set of equations describ-
ing the transmission mechanisms of monetary pol-
icy for Colombia using quarterly data from 1990Q1-
2000Q1. The sacriﬁce ratio is calculated as the accu-
mulated loss in the output gap after a shock of per-






Identiﬁcation of diﬀerent disinﬂation periods in
Colombia and estimation of the sacriﬁce ratio dur-
ing each one using the standard methodology of Ball
(1994) and alternative methodologies of Zhang (2001)
and Cecchetti and Rich (1999). SR estimate corre-
sponds to the result obtained using Zhang’s method








Estimation of a monetary SVAR with short-run re-
strictions as in Buiter and Miller (1982). Estimates of
the SR are the average diﬀerence of the steady-state
product gap with and without inﬂationary shocks for
the period 1998-2003, obtained from the historical de-







Simulation of a small open economy DSGE calibrated
for Colombia. Calculation of costs of reducing the
steady state inﬂation rate from 5.5% to 3% from the







Identiﬁcation of disinﬂation episodes between 1973
and 2000 for 18 Latin-American Countries and esti-
mation of average SR for each of the three decades
composing the sample using three alternative method-
ologies. Results show a negative disinﬂation cost for
the 1990-2000 period under all methodologies. Re-
sults reported are the average of this period estimate




*What percent the current output has to fell from its long run level, due to a reduction of 1% in trend inﬂation
points for each percentage point reduction in the inﬂation rate. This number is similar to other results found in the literature
for the US. They show that their results are consistent with the idea that most of the inﬂation persistence found in the US
inﬂation data is attributable to lack of credibility instead of to the contract structure or the existence of adaptive expectations
5The rest of paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we describe the main facts about inﬂation
persistence in Colombia for the period 1990-2010. Then, in section 3, we describe the model. In the
fourth section we brieﬂy present the estimation procedure. In the ﬁfth section we report the results. In
the sixth we compare the two models while in the seventh we compute the sacriﬁce ratios under imperfect
credibility. The last section concludes.
2 Our measure of inﬂation persistence
Standard measures of persistence such as the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients, the spectrum at zero
frequency and half life are all concepts that assume convergence to a constant mean.4 Marques (2004)
argues that measures of inﬂation persistence should be based on a time varying mean as it may reﬂect
exogenous factors such as inﬂation drivers and/or the inﬂation target. In fact, Levin and Piger (2004),
Corvoisier and Mojon (2005) and Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) show that persistence in some European
countries has been stable when computed over small samples or when the mean of inﬂation is allowed to
change. Furthermore, Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) ﬁnds similar evidence for Colombia. In these
papers inﬂation persistence is measured as sum of the auto regressive coeﬃcients in a linear model that
allows for breaks in mean. The number of breaks and the break dates are estimated using either Bai and
Perron (1988) or Altissimo and Corradi (2003).5
In line with this strand of the empirical literature, to characterize the evolving changes in the mean
of inﬂation, we use the following state-space model:
yt = µt + xt (1)
xt = ρxt−1 + ν3t
µt = βt−1 + µt−1 + ν1t
βt = βt−1 + ν2t
with νit ∼ N(0,σ2
νi), i = 1,2,3 and E[νitνjs] = 0 for i 6= j and t 6= s. Equation (1) decomposes the inﬂation
4There are other approaches to measure inﬂation persistence, like the estimation of the autocorrelation function and unit
root tests, to mention just two of them. Recently, in Colombia, Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) compares diﬀerent
measurements of statistical persistence and estimates the evolution of inﬂation and inﬂation gap persistence in Colombia for
the period 1990-2010 using a regime switching model and a Kalman ﬁlter.
5Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2007) and Cogley and Sbordone (2009) stress the importance in econometric models of
inﬂation of recognizing the low frequency movement of inﬂation. They called it “trend inﬂation”.
6process into a evolving mean component and the ﬂuctuation around it. The latter component is deﬁned by
the stationary AR(1) process xt = ρxt−1 + ν3t where ρ ∈ (−1,1) forms a persistence measure. The trend
component is given by µt and its speciﬁcation resembles the standard local linear model. The model (1)
can be easily estimated using Kalman ﬁlter and the standard error decompositions. See Harvey (1990),
West and Harrisson (1999) and Durbin and Koopman (2001) for details. The advantage of (1) compared
to other approaches is that trend and persistence are modeled simultaneously rather that sequentially6.
We use alternative indexes to measure inﬂation. One is the percentage change of the seasonally
adjusted quarterly Consumer Prices Index (CPI). In addition to CPI inﬂation, we present results for the
following inﬂation rates: πCPI-NF that excludes food from the CPI, πCPI-T and πCPI-NT that includes only
traded goods and non traded goods, πCPI-R with only regulated goods and πCPI-B that excludes food and
regulated prices from the CPI. The sample consists on quarterly data for the period 1988:1 to 2010:4.
We report the results in Table 4 and Figures 7 to 8. These results conﬁrm that most measures of
inﬂation display an important amount of persistence at the business cycle frequency. The only exceptions
being the inﬂation of regulated goods; for which the estimated trend component of inﬂation follows closely
the observed inﬂation, so deviations from trend quickly revert to the mean, and non-traded sector, which
displays a low persistence, compared with the other measures.7. Notwithstanding this, most measures of
inﬂation display high persistence.
Table 4: Estimated persistence for the diﬀerent inﬂation rates.
πCPI πCPI-T πCPI-NT πCPI-NF πCPI-R πCPI-B
ˆ ρ 0.33 0.60 0.24 0.66 -0.02 0.84
To have an indication of how much inﬂation persistence has changed in the last years, we perform a
one-quarter rolling-window estimation of the parameter ρ in the stationary AR(1) process xt = ρxt−1+ν3t,
starting in the third quarter of 1999 and ending in the fourth quarter of 2010. This period covers the
inﬂation targeting regime. Figure 1 shows the result.
We conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) and Echavarría, Rodríguez, and Rojas
(2010), which show that inﬂation persistence, measured as the component deﬁned by the autoregressive
6A similar model has being used by Clark (1987, 1989) to decompose the US real GDP between trend and cycle
7One explanation could be that price formation in the non-traded sector could be better anchored to the inﬂation target.
The non-traded sector comprises mainly service oriented businesses and construction ﬁrms. Real activity in this sector
was depressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and relative prices adjusted quickly. During the crisis the central bank tightened
monetary policy to defend the exchange rate band and so, tighter monetary policy was associated with a signiﬁcant real
exchange rate depreciation (i.e. a collapse in the relative price of the non-traded goods). We speculate that this event may
have caused a price setting behavior that puts an important weight on inﬂation expectations. This is an open question.
7Figure 1: CPI Inﬂation Persistence and volatility: Rolling












coeﬃcient has remained roughly constant. However, it is worth taking a look at the right panels of Figures
7 to 8. A visual inspection of these graphs show that the relative importance of permanent shocks to CPI
inﬂation has declined (relative to transitory shocks), in particular for the period 2001-2007. Measuring
this relative volatility accurately is very diﬃcult. Thus, if we take this graphical analysis as an heuristic
measure of persistence, we can cautiously say that inﬂation persistence has somewhat declined.
In the next section we use a model in which lack of credibility plays a key role in explaining inﬂation
dynamics at the business cycle frequency.
3 The model
Following Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), we consider a standard closed economy Neokeynesian
model commonly used in many central banks. The main elements of the model are: a Phillips an IS curve
and a monetary policy rule, described through equations (2) to (4):
πt = βEtπt+1 + λmct + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ (it − Etπt+1 + Etgt+1 − gt) (3)
8it = γiit−1 + (1 − γi)[γπ (πt − πt) + γyyt] + zt, (4)
where πt is the inﬂation rate, πt is the inﬂation target, mct is the real marginal cost and it is the nominal
interest rate. The variables gt and zt are a preference and a policy shock respectively, which we later
describe. An important element of the model is the variable ut , which represents the present value
of private agent’s error when forecasting future inﬂation and distinguishes this model from a standard
Neokeynesian model. As we will see later, this variable captures the deviation of the Phillips curve under
imperfect information with respect to the perfect information. The expectation operator Et denotes the
rational expectation of private agents if they use all available information at time t. The parameters
of this set of equations are: λ =
(1−α)(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ(1+α(−1)) where α is the share of labor factor in production, θ
the probability of keeping prices ﬁxed during the period,  the elasticity of substitution between slightly
diﬀerentiated types of goods and β ∈ (0,1] the discount factor. λ measures the slope of the Phillips curve.
σ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and γπ, γy and γr measure the degree of responsiveness
of the monetary authority to deviations from target, the output gap and past interest rate, respectively.
The rest of equations of the model describe the technology, the marginal cost, the marginal rate of
substitution and the real wage:
yt = at + (1 − α)nt (5)




yt + ηnt − gt (7)
wt = mrst (8)
where yt is output, at is a productivity shock, nt is the number of hours worked, wt is the real wage per
hour and mt is the marginal rate of substitution. Finally, η is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply
to the real wage.
The exogenous variables of the model evolve according to the following stochastic processes:
at = ρaat−1 + εa
t





where each of the innovations j follows a normal distribution with zero mean a standard deviation σj for
j = a,g,i. We assume that the innovations are uncorrelated with each other.
When information about the inﬂation target is perfect, πt is known for all t. The interesting case is
when information is not perfect. As proposed in Erceg and Levin (2003), πt varies over time due to a
combination of a white noise shock, ε
q
t, and a shock ε
p
t with persistent eﬀects on the inﬂation target. The
central bank’s reaction function is observable to agents, but the underlying components of the inﬂation
target are not. Therefore, private agents must solve a signal extraction problem to infer the components
of ¯ π.
In this model, the central bank’s inﬂation target is the sum of a constant steady-state of inﬂation ¯ π




t. The former is assumed to have an
autoregressive root close to unity while the later is assumed to have a much smaller autoregressive root.
That is, the inﬂation target evolves according to the following process:
¯ πt − ¯ π = (π
p
t − ¯ π) + π
q
t (9)













































We can write equations (9) and (10) in state-space form deﬁning Zt = [π
p




, F = diag(ρp,ρq)
and H = [1,1]. In particular, the state equation
Zt = FZt−1 + εt
represents equation (10).
Households and ﬁrms are assumed to use optimal ﬁltering to solve this signal-extraction problem; this




t to be mutually uncorrelated, with variances νp and νq
respectively, and to be uncorrelated with any other shocks in the economy. With these assumptions, the
Kalman ﬁlter can be used by private agents of the economy to obtain optimal estimates of the unobserved
10components through the following recurtion:
EtZt = FEt−1Zt−1 + Lgain(¯ πt − HFEt−1Zt−1) t = 0,...,t
where Kgain = FLgain is the Kalman gain matrix and Lgain determines how agents respond to the forecast
error, ¯ πt−HFEt−1Zt−1, by updating their estimates of the underlying components of the inﬂation target.
Therefore, given the current estimate EtZt of these components, the optimal forecast of the inﬂation target
j periods ahead is given by:
Et¯ πt+j = ¯ π + HFjEtZt
For simplicity, Erceg and Levin (2003) assume ρq = 0 and ρp = 1. Thus, the households and ﬁrms
expectations of the future inﬂation target depend only on a constant ¯ π and the expectation of the highly




t − ¯ π) = Et−1(π
p
t−1 − ¯ π) + κ(¯ πt − Et−1¯ πt). (11)
So, agents update their assessment of the persistent component of inﬂation target by the product of the
forecast error innovation and the Kalman gain parameter, κ.
Returning to Equation (2), ut is the present value of the forecast error of private agents in the
prediction of future inﬂation, that is:
ut = β (b πt+1 − Etπt+1) (12)
where b πt+1 is the rational forecast given all information available to private agents at time t, obtained
by the optimal ﬁltering process given by Equation (11). By replacing (12) in (2) we can see that in the
case of ut = 0, we obtain the standard Neokeynesian Phillips curve in the case of perfect information.
If there are discrepancies between private agents expectations under imperfect information and perfect
information then ut 6= 0. So, ut will contribute to inﬂation persistence in the case in which private agents
do not have perfect information about the evolution of the inﬂation target.
We can use Equations (12) and (2)-(4) to derive the following expression for the evolution of ut:
ut = (1 − κ)ut−1 + (1 − κ)εc
t
11where κ is the Kalman gain parameter from Equation (11) that determines the speed at which agents
learn to distinguish between the two components of the inﬂation target, and εc
t is a normally distributed
zero mean shock with standard deviation σc, associated with the shocks to the permanent component of
the inﬂation target. Notice that in the case of full information, κ = 1, agents learn at the highest possible
rate, implying ut = 0 and therefore Etπt+1 = b πt+1.
Of particular interest is the value of the learning parameter κ. We are interested in assessing the
information contained in the data about the speed at which agents have learned during the disinﬂation
period using a standard Neokeynesian model augmented by learning about the inﬂation target. Unlike
Erceg and Levin (2003), where parameter κ is calibrated from survey data, we estimate it using this
simpliﬁed version of their model and Bayesian methods. The advantages of estimating models using a
Bayesian approach are discussed formally in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). A review of the Bayesian
tools for macro economists is presented in An and Schorfheide (2007).
4 Bayesian estimation
One of the advantages of estimating economic models using a Bayesian approach is that we can incorporate
additional information on parameters through the use of priors. To perform the Bayesian estimation of
each model we follow Schorfheide (2000) and proceed in ﬁve steps which we summarize brieﬂy. First,
for a given set of parameters we solve the model using Klein (2000) method to ﬁnd the state transition
equation. The solution deﬁnes the way in which the system evolves around the deterministic steady state.
The state-space representation is completed by adding a measurement equation to the model dynamics.
The next step consists on computing the likelihood through Kalman ﬁltering and to combine it with the
prior distribution of the parameters to get the posterior density. Draws from the posterior density are
obtained using the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as described in Schorfheide (2000). The
algorithm is started at the posterior mode or some point nearby with a high probability density, found
by numerical optimization. In this section we report the data used in the estimation, our priors and
estimation results.
124.1 Data
We seek to explain the behavior of inﬂation, output, nominal interest rate and real wages. We use
quarterly HP-detrended data from 1990:1 to 2010:4. As a proxy of the nominal interest rate we use
the interest rate on 90-day certiﬁcates of deposits. Our inﬂation measure is the quarterly (annualized)
growth rate of the CPI. Output is measured as the real GDP and real wages are measured using the
manufacturing industry real wage index from Banco de la República.
4.2 Priors






. We impose strong priors on β, α and . We set β = 0.98,
which implies a real annual return close to 4%. To replicate the labor factor compensation share in real
GDP we set α = 0.36. The elasticity of substitution of the good produced by intermediate ﬁrms, , is set
to 6, which is a standard value in the literature8.
As explained in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), there is an identiﬁcation problem in the model
between the probability of adjusting prices and the elasticity of substitution. That is, θ and  cannot
be identiﬁed separately. In order to circumvent the identiﬁcation problem we choose to estimate θ for a
given markup, since the estimated parameter tells us about the implicit frequency at which ﬁrms adjust
prices in Colombia. Several studies, including Misas, López, and Parra (2009) and Bonaldi, González, ,
and Rodríguez (2010) , suggest that Colombian ﬁrms set prices every one or two quarters; we choose a
beta-prior distribution for θ with mean 0.36, which is the value estimated in Bonaldi, González, , and
Rodríguez (2010) baseline model and implies that ﬁrms set prices every 4 or 5 months, on average.
The prior distributions for the rest of the parameters in vector Φ are reported in Table 5. The inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution follows a normal distribution with mean 4 and standard
deviation 1. We use these prior because evidence for the US shows that its value is higher than 1 but
not much larger than 2. However, evidence for emerging markets shows that it should be between 2 and
5. For the Taylor rule coeﬃcients we use the priors that are commonly used in the literature: γπ = 1.5
and γy = 0.125. We use a normal distribution for both with standard deviations of 0.25 and 0.125
respectively. There is little evidence about the elasticity of labor supply to the real wage in Colombia; we
8We use strong priors for β and α because the model does not have capital and so the likelihood does not have information
for their estimation.
13Table 5: Prior and Posterior Distributions: Imperfect and Full Credibility
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Imperfect Credibility Model Full Credibility Model
Parameter Distribution Mean Std Dev Mean HPD-90 Interval Mean HPD-90 Interval
1
σ Gamma 2.3 0.5 5.38 (4.27 - 6.44) 5.05 (3.96 - 6.17)
η Gamma 3.2 0.5 3.40 (2.62 - 4.11) 4.15 (3.31 - 5.04)
θ Beta 0.36 0.02 0.29 (0.26 - 0.32) 0.37 (0.34 - 0.40 )
κ Uniform [0,1) 0.5 0.29 0.19 (0.07 - 0.32) - -
ν Uniform [0,1) 0.5 0.29 - - 0.84 (0.66 - 1.00)
γi Uniform [0,1) 0.5 0.29 0.11 (0.00 - 0.22) 0.17 (0.04 - 0.29)
γπ Normal 1.5 0.25 1.97 (1.68 - 2.24) 1.60 (1.31 - 1.89)
γy Normal 0.13 0.13 0.14 (-0.07 - 0.34) 0.22 (0.02 - 0.42)
ρa Uniform [0,1) 0.5 0.29 0.48 (0.38 - 0.59) 0.47 (0.33 - 0.62)
ρg Uniform [0,1) 0.5 0.29 0.65 (0.58 - 0.74) 0.72 (0.64 - 0.80)
σa Inv. Gamma 0.01 ∞ 0.008 (0.006 - 0.009) 0.009 (0.007 - 0.01)
σg Inv. Gamma 0.01 ∞ 0.05 (0.04 - 0.06) 0.05 (0.04 - 0.06)
σi Inv. Gamma 0.01 ∞ 0.028 (0.02 - 0.03) 0.026 (0.02 - 0.03)
σc Inv. Gamma 0.01 ∞ 0.01 (0.008 - 0.01) - -
log(ˆ L) 940.06 746.71
use the estimates obtained in Prada and Rojas (2010) as priors for the estimation of the inverse of labor
supply elasticity (η) and the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ). For all autoregressive
parameters we use a uniform prior between [0,1) and, for all standard deviations of shocks, an inverse
gamma distribution with mean 0.01.
As for the credibility parameters, results for the US suggest that κ is around 0.13. Nevertheless, we use
an uniform which accounts for the lack of evidence regarding the value of these parameters in emerging
countries and Colombia, particularly.
5 Results
We use a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw four chains of 200.000 draws from the
posterior distribution of Φ and construct the estimates for each parameter using half the draws of each
chain. The acceptance rates for each chain were between 0.3 and 0.4. We use methods developed by
Brooks and Gelman (1998) to monitor the convergence of the posterior draws estimates.9 Estimation
results are shown in Table 5.
The data supports the idea of lack of credibility as κ, the speed at which agents learn in the economy,
9The results of this exercise are available upon request.
14is diﬀerent than one and closer to zero. So, we can reject the hypothesis of perfect credibility. Our
ﬁndings show that the posterior mean of the speed of learning is κ = 0.19, while the estimated probability
of keeping prices ﬁxed during a quarter is 0.29, lower than the estimate obtained for the full-credibility
model (0.37). We argue that this is due to imperfect credibility, which captures the persistence of inﬂation
more closely than the standard model.
For the policy rule parameters, we ﬁnd a the posterior mean response to inﬂation of γπ = 1.97, to
the output gap of γy = 0.14 and a smoothing desire of γi = 0.11. The response to inﬂation diﬀers from
our prior, that were set accordingly to the Taylor principle. Our results show an active central bank
when responding to deviations from long run inﬂation and a passive one when responding to output.
This result is in line with recent theoretical developments of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). They ﬁnd
that social welfare increases when the central bank only responds to inﬂation. However Bernal (2002),
using a classical approach to estimate Taylor rules in a partial equilibrium model for Colombia, ﬁnds that
γπ = 1.34, γy = 0.19 and γi = 0.10. We interpret our results as supporting the idea that, given the lack
of credibility on monetary policy during a large part of the sample, the response of the central bank to
inﬂation has to be higher than in environments with higher credibility.
The 90% highest-posterior density interval (HPD) for the intertemporal rate of substitution coeﬃcient
(σ) is of (4.27 − 6.44). The point estimate is 5.38, which lies in the upper end of the estimates obtained
for the Emerging Market economies in the International Macroeconomics literature. The high values of
the estimates of the coeﬃcient of intertemporal rate of substitution reﬂect the higher variability of the
macroeconomic time series typically found in Emerging Markets.
We also obtain an estimation of the labor supply elasticity. The posterior mean of η is 3.4. , implying
a labor supply elasticity of 0.29, which is in line with the results of Prada and Rojas (2010), who estimate
the Frisch elasticity in Colombia for the period 2001-2006 obtaining a value of 0.31.
The rest of the parameters are the autocorrelation and standard deviations of the shocks (productivity,
preferences, monetary policy and the target shock). There is a signiﬁcant amount of persistence in the
productivity and preference shocks, the posterior mean of their autocorrelation coeﬃcients are 0.48 and
0.65, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.72 percent and 4.86 percent. The posterior mean of the
volatility of the interest rate rule shock and the inﬂation target is 2.8 percent and one percent, respectively.
We attribute this high value of the target shock to the period of high and volatile inﬂation in Colombia
that characterized the ﬁrst part of our sample.
15We perform an additional exercise to assess the impact of inﬂation targeting on the estimated speed
at which agents learn about the inﬂation target. We split the sample in two periods: one, from 1990 to
2000 and the second from 2001 to 2010. The break corresponds (approximately) to the date in which we
think inﬂation targeting was implemented (by the end of 1999).
Figure 2: Estimated speed of learning ˆ κ for pre- and post-inﬂation targeting periods














The graph shows a faster speed of learning for the post inﬂation targeting sample. Also notice that
the full-sample estimated value of κ is closer to the value obtained for the ﬁrst sample, the years before
inﬂation targeting. Most of the information in the data appears to be concentrated in that part of the
sample. This suggests that there are credibility gains in the last ten years. Nonetheless, the fact that
inﬂation persistence has fallen, albeit not in a signiﬁcantly, suggests that the impact of those gains has
not been large.
Yet, the model reveals one important fact of the Colombian business cycle. A quick inspection of the
smoothed shocks, shown in ﬁgure 6, obtained in our estimation shows that the variability of all shocks is
lower since the end of 2000, close to the date in which the inﬂation targeting regime was implemented.10.
In this sense we could argue that the implementation of IT in Colombia is associated with a higher degree
of macroeconomic stability. This result is consistent with our ﬁnding of the previous section that the
relative importance of permanent shocks has diminished in the last few years.
In the next section we compare the lack of credibility model to a standard Neokeynesian model with
ad-hoc inﬂation indexation.
10See ﬁgure 6. The inﬂation targeting regime starts from position 50 in the graph
166 Model Comparison and Inﬂation Persistence
The Neokeynesian model is a standard model in many central banks. To induce inﬂation persistence
many modelers introduce ad-hoc indexation, but keep the perfect information assumption. We estimate
such a model by replacing equation 2 with:
πt = φ1πt−1 + φ2Etπt+1 + φ3mct
Where φ1 = ν
1+νβ,φ2 =
β
1+νβ ,φ3 = λ
1+νβ and ν is the degree of price indexation to past inﬂation
11 . We use the same priors for the estimated parameters in order to compare the performance of the
imperfect credibility model against the conventional model. Table 5 reports the results of the estimation
of the Neokeynesian model with price indexation.
To compare the two models we perform a posterior odds test. The posterior odds ratio is the ratio of
the posterior model probabilities. Consider the two models Mp and Mi with two associated parameters
θp and θi where p refers to the model with perfect information and i refers to the model with imperfect
information. Both models were estimated using the sample YT. The ﬁt of each model m = p,i, is given by






by integrating out the parameters θm from the posterior kernel. Using Bayes theorem, we can compute
the posterior distribution over models as:











11We use a uninformative prior for the estimation of this parameter, as in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2005).




also known as the Bayes factor. As the Bayes factor gets larger, the higher the support for model Mi.
We ﬁnd that p(YT |Mi) = exp(940.1) while p(YT |Mp) = exp(746.7) implying a log-Bayes factor
around 193, so that the odds are strongly in favor of the imperfect credibility model.12
One interesting result of this exercise is the impact of the imperfect information assumption on the
estimation of the degree of stickiness in the economy. According to the literature on inﬂation persistence,
we can identify three sources of inﬂation persistence: extrinsic, intrinsic and expectations-driven. The ﬁrst
can be associated with the coeﬃcient that accompanies the real marginal cost, λ, in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC), equation (2). The second with the lagged inﬂation term. The third, in a full
information model, with the inﬂation expectations term, while in an imperfect credibility model we can
associate the degree of persistence with parameter κ.
To analyze the degree of extrinsic persistence the key parameter is the probability of keeping prices
ﬁxed during a quarter. Recall that in the imperfect information model this probability is 29 percent,
implying price changes, in average, every 1.4 quarters. In the full information model with price indexation
this parameter value raises to 1.5 percent implying price changes every 1.54 quarters. It seems that the
assumption of price indexation coupled with full information tends to increase the degree of extrinsic
persistence by lowering the responsiveness of inﬂation to the real marginal cost13.
The degree of intrinsic persistence is similar in both models. Although we did not estimate parameter
β in the imperfect credibility model, its value obtained in the estimation of a full information model is
very similar.
Finally, the expectations-driven persistence on the full information model is closely linked to the
intrinsic one through the discount factor, while in the imperfect information model is determined by
parameter κ. Our results show that this is our main source of inﬂation persistence in Colombia. Agents
learn at a relatively slow pace. Compared to the US disinﬂation period, our rate is more than one-fourth
times the rate at with agents learn in the US. We could associate this result to the fact to the inﬂation
12We use the Laplace approximation.
13To see this we draw from the distribution of parameter λ and ﬁnd that its mode on the case of price indexation is 0.098,
while in the case of imperfect credibility is 0.274.
18target policy that the central bank follows in Colombia which has allowed anchoring inﬂation expectations
to a long run inﬂation target.
The estimation of the policy rule is consistent with this idea. The responsiveness of the central bank
to deviations of inﬂation from target is higher under imperfect credibility than under full information
and price indexation. This means that the central bank has to exert more eﬀort when it faces a lack of
credibility problem than when it faces a price indexation problem. In the next section we use the model
to estimate how costly has been to disinﬂate without anchored expectations.
7 Disinﬂation Costs
How large have been the disinﬂation costs under imperfect credibility in Colombia? One way to answer
this question is to use the estimated model and compute the sacriﬁce in terms of the output gap of
reducing the inﬂation target by 100 bp. We also compute the eﬀort of monetary policy in terms of the
increment of the policy rate.
Under full credibility a central bank can disinﬂate at little or no output cost. By relaxing this
assumption, the disinﬂation cost depends on the degree of credibility of the monetary authority. In the
model, agents learn gradually about the permanence of the target shock. So, the speed at which agents
learn provides a natural measure of the degree of credibility of the central bank. If agents learn quickly
the disinﬂation process will resemble the perfect credibility case. The slower the speed of learning the
greater the output costs and the eﬀort of monetary policy.
Given the estimated speed of learning, we compute the macroeconomic eﬀects of a 100 bp disinﬂation
focusing on the sacriﬁce ratio and the monetary policy eﬀort. We measure the sacriﬁce ratio as the present
value of the output gap during the disinﬂation period. To measure the monetary policy eﬀort we compute
the present value of the nominal interest rate gap during the disinﬂation period. Both present values
depend on the discount factor used. In the estimation of the model we used a 0.98 discount. We vary this
parameter between 0.95 and 0.99 to check the sensibility of our measurement of the sacriﬁce ratio to the
discount factor used. Table 6 reports the sacriﬁce ratio and the monetary policy eﬀort under alternative
discount factors.
In the benchmark estimation, a 100 basis points shock to the inﬂation target requires the central bank
19Table 6: Disinﬂation Costs and Monetary Policy Eﬀort (basis points)
β
0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
Sacriﬁce Ratio 75 77 80 83 86
Policy Eﬀort 134 138 144 149 155
Figure 3: Response to a decrease of the inﬂation target under imperfect credibility






























































to keep interest rates by nearly 150 bp above average generating a sacriﬁce of 83 bp in output. The eﬀects
of the disinﬂation shock takes about three to ﬁve years to dissipate. In the model, to eﬀectively reduce
inﬂation in 100 bp a shock to the target of equal magnitude is not enough. The central bank needs to
exert more eﬀort in order to reduce inﬂation in 100 bp eﬀectively.
This sacriﬁce ratio is in line with those estimated previously in the literature by Gómez and Julio
(2000), Reyes (2003), Sarmiento and Ramírez (2005), but higher than those obtained by Hamann, Julio,
Restrepo, and Riascos (2005) for Colombia, and Hofstetter (2007) for the average of 18 Latin American
countries in a 30-years sample.
The diﬀerences with respect to these last two papers arise from the type of model used and from the
type of estimation used. With respect to Hamann, Julio, Restrepo, and Riascos (2005), it is well known
20that Neokeynesian models without strong ad-hoc persistence (as the one used in that paper) exhibit small
sacriﬁce ratios. With respect to Hofstetter (2007), as the author explains, the negative sacriﬁce ratios
arise from a unique set of conditions that occurred in Latin America during the period 1990-2000.
The sensitivity of this result depends on the discount factor used compute the present value of the
cost in terms of output. Using a discount factor of β = 0.95, the disinﬂation cost falls to 75 bp. Interest
rates have to be 134 bp higher on average during the disinﬂation period.
More importantly, to gauge the impact of the degree of imperfect credibility on the sacriﬁce ratio, we
can use the model to compute the disinﬂation cost under alternative values of κ, the speed of learning
parameter. Notice how the larger the κ the smaller the disinﬂation cost and the lower the eﬀort of the
central bank.
Figure 4: Output and interest rate gaps after a decrease of 1% in the inﬂation target
Output Gap Interest Rate Gap





























This paper asked whether lack of credibility on the central bank’s inﬂation target could have played an
important role in explaining the persistence of inﬂation observed in the Colombian data at business cycle
frequencies. To answer that question we used a state-space model which decomposed the inﬂation process
into a time-varying mean component and the cyclical movement around it. The model was estimated using
the Kalman ﬁlter conﬁrming the results found by Echavarría, López, and Misas (2010) and Echavarría,
Rodríguez, and Rojas (2010) that inﬂation persistence has not changed signiﬁcantly in the last decade.
Despite this, we argue that our results allows us to infer (heuristically) that the importance of persistent
shocks to inﬂation relative to transitory shocks has diminished. We take this as indirect evidence that
inﬂation persistence has somewhat declined during the disinﬂation process.
21More importantly, we were able to identify, using Erceg and Levin (2003) model, the sources behind
inﬂation persistence. We estimated and tested that model against the conventional Neokeynesian model
with inﬂation indexation using Bayesian analysis and showed that the posterior odds supports the lack
of credibility model.
As a by-product of our estimation, we obtained estimates of the monetary policy rule of the central
bank under imperfect credibility on the inﬂation target. We ﬁnd that the central bank reacts more to
inﬂation, less to output and smooths less the policy rate in comparison to the standard Neokeynesian
model under full-credibility and ad-hoc inﬂation indexation.
We then obtained estimates of the speed at which agents learn about the ultimate intentions of the
Colombian central bank. We found that credibility has been higher after the central implemented the
inﬂation targeting strategy by the end of 1999. Although the standard measure of inﬂation persistence
has remained roughly unchanged, the data and our econometric methodology allow us to infer that the
importance of permanent shocks relative to transitory shocks has declined somewhat. Thus, we interpret
these results as evidence that the credibility of the central bank has increased and has reduced inﬂation
persistence but those gains have been modest. Why this happens is an important open question for future
research.
Finally, we calculated the sacriﬁce ratio implied by the imperfect credibility model and found a sacriﬁce
ratio (0.83%) in line with those previously estimated in the literature.
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25Appendix 1: Imperfect Credibility NKM-Estimation Results
Figure 5: Prior and Posterior Distributions:


























































































26Figure 6: Imperfect Credibility Model: Smoothed Shocks







































27Appendix 2: Inﬂation Persistence - Estimation Results
Table 7: Estimated µtand xt: IPC and IPCt
πCPI




















































































28Table 8: Estimated µtand xt: IPC and IPCt
πCPI−R
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